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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of manufacturers to deal exclusively
with retailers in bilaterally duopolistic industries with brand differentiation by manufac-
turers. With highly differentiated products exclusive contracts are shown to generate
higher profits for manufacturers and retailers, who thus have an incentive to insist on
exclusive contracting. However, if the products are close substitutes no exclusivity will
emerge in equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
A puzzling feature of many industries is that manufacturers commit themself to sell ex-
clusively through few retailers to the final consumers. At first glance it can be hard to
understand why producers would engage to lessen the downstream competition. Intu-
itively, one would expect that tougher competition leads to lower prices, which implies
higher sales for the manufacturer. Yet, we encounter with such exclusive contracts in
several industries, with most notable examples in telecommunications1 and in the phar-
maceutical industry. The practice of exclusive contracts has been a subject of interest
Email address: barna.bako@uni-corvinus.hu (Barna Bako´)
1For example Apple’s and Google’s contracts with the mobile service providers regarding selling
iPhones and Nexus.
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in the recent literature, though most of the articles study such contracting situations
suggesting triangle structures (monopolistic player on one side and duopolistic agents
on the other side). While these results have generated important insights about the na-
ture of such contracting games, it is fair to say that the analysis of exclusive contracts
in bilaterally oligopolistic markets has been largely ignored in the literature and less is
known about the consequences in set-ups where both the upstream and the downstream
market contain more then one player. The analysis below focuses on the strategic deci-
sion as whether exclusive contracts are profitable in a bilaterally duopolistic setting or
not.
It is well known2 that when retailers can observe the contracts offered by a manufacturer
to different retailers the joint profit maximizing outcome can be achieved. This result,
however, relies crucially on contract observability. If the manufacturer can deal secretly
with the retailers a free-riding effect evolves that restrain the parties to achieve the joint
profit of an integrated vertical structure. As first shown by Hart and Tirole (1990) in the
presence of contract externalities exclusive contracts can be used to solve this problem
(see also O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) and Segal and
Whinston (2003)).3 They arrive to the conclusion that a single upstream producer, which
sells its product through undifferentiated retailers always offers an exclusive contract to
a retailer. Intuitively, in their case there is no loss from selling through a single retailer
and contracting externalities are eliminated with exclusive representation. However, this
result can be spurious if there is more than one producer. The reason is that while an
exclusive contract solves the problem of opportunism between retailers, it pares down
the manufacturer’s sales, which, if it is unilateral, can lead to less profit for the producer.
Such profit reducing effects can outweigh the profit increasing effect arising by solving the
problem of contracting externality. Therefore, the producers can experience a prisoners’
dilemma in their contracting decision. As we will show in this paper this dilemma will
emerge when products produced by manufacturers are sufficiently close substitutes. In
this case the producers will abstain from using exclusive contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and analyzes
the equilibrium outcomes. Section 3 discusses the welfare implications, and Section 4
2See Whinston (2006) for discussions of these issues.
3The main concern of Hart and Tirole (1990) was vertical integration which was adopted to study
exclusive contracts by O’Brien and Shaffer (1992).
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concludes.
2. The model
We consider the following vertical structure. There are two upstream manufacturers
(M1 and M2) and two downstream retailers (RA and RB). The manufacturers face
constant marginal costs ci, (i = 1, 2), the retailers, in addition to the costs of obtaining
the products from the manufacturers have a constant unit cost cj (j = A,B), which
are normalized to zero (cA = cB = 0). We assume that final goods are symmetrically
differentiated, and the inverse demands for the final good i can be given by
pi(qi, q−i) = 1− qi − δq−i (1)
where i,−i = 1, 2, and δ ∈ (0, 1). We interpret δ as the degree of product differentiation.
For δ close to 1 downstream firms supply homogenous products, while for δ close to 0
the firms supply to independent markets.
The game Γ we consider is as follows. First, manufacturers decide simultaneously whether
or not to offer exclusive contracts to one of the retailers. This decision is observable for
every player. Next, if a manufacturer decides not to engage in exclusive contracts, it will
make secret offers to each retailer in the form of (qij , tij), with qij the quantity that the
manufacturer i offers to the retailer j, and tij the total transfer that the manufacturer
i gets from retailer j. In the third step, retailers announce simultaneously whether they
accept any of the offers. A retailer that rejects the offers has nothing to sell and earns
zero profit. In the final stage quantity competition occurs among retailers, and markets
clear.
Due to private contracts, when a retailer receives an offer it has to form a conjecture
about the contracts received by the other retailer. Here, we restrict our attention to
passive beliefs in which, a retailer after receiving an out of equilibrium offer, continues
to believe that the other retailer receives its equilibrium offers (see Segal and Whinston
(2003)). Furthermore, if a retailer receives an exclusive contract, then it knows the other
retailer has not received any offer from the same manufacturer.
Let (q∗1A, q
∗
1B , q
∗
2A, q
∗
2B , t
∗
1A, t
∗
1B , t
∗
2A, t
∗
2B) denote the equilibrium outcome. With pas-
sive beliefs if retailer j(= A) receives an offer from manufacturer i(= 1) such that
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(q1A, t1A) 6= (q∗1A, t∗1A) it still believes that the other retailer receives its equilibrium offers
(q∗ij , t
∗
ij)ij 6=1A and accepts this contract if and only if p1(q1A + q
∗
1B , q
∗
2A + q
∗
2B)q1A ≥ t1A
and p2(q
∗
2A + q
∗
2B , q1A + q
∗
1B)q
∗
2A ≥ t∗2A respectively. Given this, the manufacturer’s offer
must be pairwise stable in the sense that
q∗1A = arg max
q1A
[(p1A − c1)q1A + t∗1B − c1q∗1B ] (2)
which is the joint profit of M1 and RA. Moreover, these are the same conditions that
would hold if the manufacturers wouldn’t exist and the retailers would compete as multi-
product duopolists, each with c1 and c2 product specific marginal costs.
We solve the game by backward induction. First consider the subgame where the manu-
facturers don’t commit themselves to sell exclusively for any of the downstream players
and offer a non-exclusive contract to both of the retailers. In equilibrium (q∗1A, q
∗
1B , q
∗
2A, q
∗
2B)
must satisfy
q∗1A = arg max
q1A
[p1(q1A + q
∗
1B , q
∗
2A + q
∗
2B)− c1]q1A
q∗1B = arg max
q1B
[p1(q
∗
1A + q1B , q
∗
2A + q
∗
2B)− c1]q1B
q∗2A = arg max
q2A
[p2(q2A + q
∗
2B , q
∗
1A + q
∗
1B)− c2]q2A
q∗2B = arg max
q2B
[p2(q
∗
2A + q2B , q
∗
1A + q
∗
1B)− c2]q2B (3)
which yields
q∗ij =
3(1− ci)− 2δ(1− c−i)
9− 4δ2 (4)
where i,−i = 1, 2; i 6= −i and j = A,B. Equilibrium profits and prices thus equal
pi∗i =
2[3(1− ci)− 2δ(1− c−i)]2
(9− 4δ2)2 (5)
p∗i =
3(1 + 2ci)− 2δ(1− c−i)− 4δ2ci
(9− 4δ2) (6)
where i,−i = 1, 2 and i 6= −i.
Now consider the case when M1 offers an exclusive contract to a retailer, say RA. In
this case the product of M1 is available for purchasing only at RA, yet the other manu-
facturer’s product is still available for sale at any retailer. In this case the problem (3)
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boils down to
q∗1A = arg max
q1A
[p1(q1A + 0, q
∗
2A + q
∗
2B)− c1]q1A
q∗2A = arg max
q2A
[p2(q2A + q
∗
2B , q
∗
1A + 0)− c2]q2A
q∗2B = arg max
q2B
[p2(q
∗
2A + q2B , q
∗
1A + 0)− c2]q2B (7)
Solving for q1A, q2A and q2B yields
pi∗1 =
[3(1− c1)− 2δ(1− c2)]2
4(3− δ2)2 (8)
pi∗2 =
[2(1− c2)− δ(1− c1)]2
2(3− δ2)2 (9)
and
p∗1 =
3(1 + c1)− 2δ(1− c2) + 2δ2(c1)
2(3− δ2) (10)
p∗2 =
2(1 + 2c2)− δ(1− c1)− 2δ2(c2)
2(3− δ2) (11)
Then, by solving the game backward, we obtain the manufacturers’ payoffs in the different
sub-games at stage 1 as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The payoff matrix
M2
no contract RA RB
no contract (a1, a2) (e1, b2) (e1, b2)
M1 RA (b1, e2) (d1, d2) (d1, d2)
RB (b1, e2) (d1, d2) (d1, d2)
where i,−i = 1, 2 and
ai =
2[3(1−ci)−2δ(1−c−i)]2
(9−4δ2)2 bi =
[3(1−ci)−2δ(1−c−i)]2
4(3−δ2)2
ei =
[2(1−ci)−δ(1−c−i)]2
2(3−δ2)2 di =
[2(1−ci)−δ(1−c−i)]2
(4−δ2)2
The game has several equilibria depending on the level of product differentiation. One
can easily see that if δ ∈ (
√
2−√2, 1) the unique subgame perfect equilibria is when the
manufacturers don’t engage in exclusive contracting and both of them offer a contract to
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the retailers with strictly positive quantities such that condition (3) is satisfied. On the
other hand, if the products are highly differentiated, i.e. δ ∈ (0,
√
3(2−√2)
2 ), both manu-
facturers will offer an exclusive contract to a retailer. Under intermediate differentiation
levels, that is when δ ∈ (
√
3(2−√2)
2 ,
√
2−√2), both outcomes can emerge in equilibrium.
Note that there is no equilibrium in which only one of the manufacturer would offer an
exclusive contract to a retailer. This can occur only under mixed strategies.
. . . .
Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes as a function of product differenctiation.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the contracting game.
Proposition 2.1. Under highly differentiated products manufacturers engage in exclu-
sive contracting, while when the products are less differentiated the manufacturers will
offer non-exclusive contracts to the retailers.
The intuition for the results captured in Proposition 2.1 is straightforward. For δ belong-
ing to the interval (0,
√
3(2−√2)
2 ) the product differentiation is too strong and producers
use exclusive contracts to solve the problem of contracting externality. If both manufac-
turers happen to sign an exclusive contract with the same retailer, the other retailer is
driven out from the market, however this is not an explicit purpose for manufacturers.
On the other hand, if the products are close substitutes producers are experiencing a
prisoners’ dilemma. Exclusive contracts still could solve the problem caused by contract
externalities, but by using unilateral exclusive contract a manufacturer restricts its out-
put, which primarily benefits the other firm. The firm without exclusivity gains from the
restriction of output by the other firm, without having to restrict output himself. The
manufacturer with an exclusive contracts commits himself to be less aggressive, which ul-
timately has a negative effect on his profit. Therefore, in equilibrium both manufacturers
will choose to sell without exclusive contracts.
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3. Welfare implications
This section discusses the welfare implications of our model. To evaluate consumer
welfare we consider a representative consumer’s utility function which is consistent with
the demand system given by (1). Such a utility in monetary units of consuming qi units
of product i, and qj units of product j, can be given as
U(qi, q−i) = qi + q−i − 1
2
(q2i + 2δqiq−i + q
2
−i) (12)
Plugging into this the equilibrium quantities and substracting the costs involved by
consuming these quantities, we get the consumer surpluses for the different sub-cases.
Denote by CWnc the consumer welfare that would prevail in the case when manufacturers
don’t sign exclusive contracts, and by CW 1k2l (k, l = A,B) when both manufacturers
sign an exclusive contracts. It can be shown that
Proposition 3.1.
CWnc > CW 1k2l k, l = A,B
always holds.
Thus, a social planner who is more concerned about the consumer welfare than the total
surplus, should ban the practice of exclusive contracts. To evaluate the welfare effects,
we compare the situations with exclusive contracts to the situation in which exclusivity
is not possible. Social welfare is given by
W = CW + pi1 + pi2 (13)
where pii represents the joint profits of manufacturer i and his downstream retailer(s).
Using the consumers’ welfare and equilibrium profit levels given in Section 1, yields the
following (k, l = A,B)
Wnc > W 1k2l for δ ∈
(
0,
√
2−
√
2
)
(14)
We already know that in the case when manufacturers produce highly differentiated prod-
ucts they would engage in exclusive dealing in their practice of selling their products. The
outcome emerging in equilibrium always leads to a smaller aggregate surplus, compared
to the case where using exclusive contracts is not possible. Moreover, if the products are
close substitutes the profits gain by manufacturers exceeds the loss of consumer welfare
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caused by exclusive contracts. However in this case the outcome with exclusives will not
emerge in the equilibrium. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Social welfare in the case in which manufacturers sell with non-
exclusive contracts exceeds social welfare in the case in which manufacturers sell their
products exclusively if the products produced by the manufacturers are highly differenti-
ated.
4. Conclusion
In the prevailing literature on exclusive contracts it has been argued that manufactur-
ers will engage in using exclusive contracts when products are undifferentiated, and will
never sign such contracts, if the products are highly differentiated. This result, however,
depends crucially on the fact that the upstream market is supposed to be monopolistic.
The results change if we consider multiplayer upstream market. As we have shown in this
paper, the manufacturers will engage in exclusive contracting when the product differen-
tiation is strong. In this case an exclusivity will solve the problem of contract externality.
If the products are less differentiated the manufacturers experience a prisoner’s dilemma,
where, by having an incentive to solve the externality problem, a unilateral switch leads
to a lower profit. In this case manufacturers will offer non-exclusivity to the retailers.
The outcome with no exclusive dealing is shown to generate higher consumer welfare, as
well as higher aggregate surplus.
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